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Executive Summary 
 
This research paper is motivated by a long tail at the bottom of the educational distribution, 
educational inequality between those from high and low socio-economic groups and the 
question as to what role an increase in school resources has in changing all this. The issue 
about whether investing more money in schools is effective has long been controversial in 
the academic literature. It is also a controversial policy issue in this time of public 
expenditure cuts and reforms to educational finance. With regard to the latter, the Pupil 
Premium is an important new policy introduced this year – and this paper is useful for 
considering the potential effects. 
 
To investigate the causal link between educational expenditure and pupil outcomes at the 
end of primary school, we make use of the fact that schools which are close together but in 
different Local Authorities can get very different levels of funding. This arises because of an 
anomaly in the national funding formula for schools, which compensates for differences in 
labour costs between areas even though in reality teachers are drawn from the same labour 
market and are paid according to national pay scales. Thus, the ‘area cost adjustment’ in the 
national funding formula implies different levels of resources for very similar schools. We 
evaluate whether schools with different levels of expenditure (on account of this anomaly) 
have different outcomes in national tests for pupils at the end of primary school. Schools 
that are close enough  geographically to enable this strategy tend to be in urban areas with 
a higher intake of disadvantaged students (measured as eligible to receive free school 
meals). 
 
Our study uses the National Pupil Database ( a census of all students in state schools) 
between 2002 and 2009. The data contains information on the national test scores of all 11 
year olds in England (at the end of key Stage 2) in English, Maths and Science. It also 
contains information on the prior attainment of each person (at age 7), demographic 
information and  can be linked to school-level information (including school expenditure), 
local house prices and an index of income deprivation.  
 
The results show large effects of expenditure on educational attainment at the end of 
primary school. They suggest that an additional £1,000 per student paid to schools in these 
urban areas (close to Local Authority borders) raises student test scores at Key Stage 2 by 
around 0.25 standard deviations. This effect is equivalent to moving 19% of students 
currently achieving Level 4 in maths (the target grade) to Level 5 (the top grade) and 31% of 
students currently at  Level 3 maths to Level 4.  Also, the effects of expenditure tend to be 
higher in schools with more disadvantaged pupils. This is an important result because 
convincing evidence on the effects of expenditure increases has been hard to come by. Also, 
these effects are large and give some support for policies like the Pupil Premium (although 
this needs to be put in the context of rising inflation and no nominal increase in funding for 
schools apart from the Pupil Premium). However, if the Pupil Premium really materialised 
into a net increase of £400 per pupil, this would translate into an increase in test scores of 
about 10% of a standard deviation. If all the funding was spent specifically on pupils eligible 
to receive free school meals (i.e. £2,000 per student only for those pupils), this could raise 
their achievement by around 0.5 standard deviations. This would eliminate the gap in 
achievement in primary school between students who are eligible to receive schools meals 
and those who are not. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
Improvement of the educational attainment of poor children is a top priority in many countries. 
This is a particular problem in countries, like the UK and US, where there are long and sizable tails 
in the bottom end of the adult distribution of basic literacy and numeracy skills (OECD, 1995). The 
bottom tail is heavily populated with people who have been disadvantaged since childhood.1 An 
analysis for recent cohorts of school children in the UK finds that there is a considerable attainment 
gap at school entry between pupils eligible to receive free school meals and the rest which widens 
over time (National Equality Panel, 2010).2 Many of these children live in inner-city urban areas.  
 
In England, much controversy has arisen because closely neighbouring schools with similar pupil 
intakes can receive markedly different levels of core funding if they are in different education 
authorities. This happens partly because of rules in how funding is allocated to Local Authorities by 
central government. 3 In brief, ‘area cost adjustments’ are made that are intended to compensate 
for differences in labour costs between areas whereas in reality teachers are drawn from the same 
labour market and are paid according to national pay scales. Consequently, schools which are close 
together but in different Local Authorities can get very different levels of funding, despite being 
otherwise very similar in their geographical location, catchment areas and student intakes. Primary 
schools in urban areas are particularly exposed to this funding anomaly, since they tend to be close 
together and attract pupils from the local area in which they are located. These schools also have a 
relatively high percentage of poor children. This anomaly in the English funding system therefore 
allows us to evaluate the effect of expenditure on such schools using boundary discontinuity 
techniques. In the education literature, these techniques have often been used to look at the 
impact of school test scores on house prices as well as being used in other areas of economics (e.g. 
                                                     
1
 It has long been established that family background and early childhood experiences are the most important 
determinants of educational outcomes (Coleman, 1966). The relationship between family background and educational 
attainment is stronger in England than in any of the 54 countries included in the TIMSS study (Scheutz et al. 2005; 
Blanden, 2009).  
2
  Specifically, the proportion of poor children reaching the ‘expected level’ at school entry (the ‘Foundation Stage’) is 
22 percentage points lower than others. This widens over time. For example, on leaving school only 13 per cent of pupils 
eligible to receive free school meals go on to higher education compared to 32 per cent of all others (NEP report. p.341). 
3
 Local Authorities are the local government districts through which most schooling in England is organised. We are 
primarily interested in differences between local authorities in the funding received from central government. Another 
source of variation (where we do not have good information) is different rules in how Local Authorities allocate funding 
within areas. 
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the taxation literature).4  We show that schools on either side of Local Authority boundaries receive 
different levels of funding and that this is associated with a sizeable differential in pupil 
achievement at the end of primary school.  
 
This investigation is important for two main reasons. Firstly, improving the attainment of children 
in disadvantaged urban areas is a top priority because of concerns about economic inequality (of 
which education is one aspect) and the heavy bottom tail of the educational distribution. It is 
important to identify the effects of expenditure on this population. In fact, the UK government is 
introducing a ‘pupil premium’ that is directed at pupils from deprived backgrounds. The level of the 
pupil premium (£430 per pupil) will be the same for every deprived pupil no matter where they 
live. This investigation gives us a good idea of the likely impact of such a policy. 
 
Secondly, there is an age-old debate in the academic literature on the causal effect of raising school 
expenditure on pupil attainment. The relationship is hard to identify because expenditure is often 
allocated to schools partly on the basis of need (which is negatively related to pupil attainment). 
Studies that identify the effect in a convincing way are relatively few and there are very different 
views on the overall interpretation of the literature from economists working in this field. 
Hanushek (2008) argues that accumulated research says that there is currently no clear, systematic 
relationship between resources and student outcomes. However high quality studies that do show 
effect include Angrist and Lavy’s (1999) study on the effect of class size in Israel; studies on the 
experimental Tennessee STAR class size reduction (Krueger, 1999; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001); 
and studies that have made use of student finance reforms (Guryan, 2001; Roy, 2004). There have 
also been a couple of recent papers in England that have found modest effects of increased school 
resources (Machin et al. 2010; Holmlund et al. 2010).  
 
To preview our results, we show that schools close to Local Authority boundaries that are well 
matched in terms of pupil characteristics do receive different levels of funding from central 
government and these differences in resources are associated with differentials in pupil 
                                                     
4
 With respect to the literature on the effect of test scores on house prices, papers that use regression discontinuity 
methods include Black (1999), Kane et al. (2005), Fack and Grenet (2008) and Gibbons et al. (2008). The method is used 
in many other areas of economics – for example Cushing (1984) uses it to look at the effect of taxation on house prices. 
Duranton, Overman and Gobillon (2011) look at the effect of taxation on firms using a combined discontinuity and 
instrumental variables methodology that is similar to ours.  
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performance. Specifically, we group schools close to Local Authority boundaries into 
neighbourhood clusters on the basis of proximity and the extent of disadvantage (as measured by 
the proportion of children eligible to receive free school meals). We instrument school expenditure 
using variables that capture cross-boundary variation in the funding formula. Our results imply that 
an additional £400 per student could raise achievement by around 10 per cent of a standard 
deviation. These effects, are however higher in schools that have higher proportions of 
disadvantaged students. The effects reported here are larger than those typically found in the 
literature and suggest that increasing school expenditure has an important part to place in raising 
educational attainment in disadvantaged urban areas. Although we cannot provide decisive 
evidence on the channels through which increased spending is effective, we provide some 
additional evidence on how school spending responded to the cross-boundary income differentials 
in these urban schools. We find that the additional income was spent disproportionately on 
learning resources, supplies and bought-in professional services, rather than teaching staff. These 
changes in the budget shares are, however, quite small. 
 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follow: we discuss the institutional structure of schools 
in England and how funding is allocated (Section 2); data (Section 3); empirical strategy (Section 4); 
regression results (Section 5); and discussion and conclusions (Section 6).  
 
 
2 Education in England: the Institutional Structure 
 
 
In England, there is a National Curriculum and years of compulsory education are organised into 
four ‘Key Stages’ (ending at the age of 7, 11, 14 and 16). At the end of primary school (end of ‘Key 
Stage 2), all students in England undertake national tests in English, Maths and Science. These are 
national tests that are externally set and marked. They are important in the accountability system 
since they form the basis of School Performance Tables (or ‘league tables’) at the end of primary 
school. Our outcome variable will be test scores at this stage of education (when children are aged 
11).  
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There are about 15,000 primary schools in England. Schooling is organised at the local level by Local 
Authorities, which are usually the same bodies as the local councils that control other aspects of 
local government. The majority of pupils attend ‘Community Schools’ (i.e. 67% of pupils). In this 
case, the Local Authority employs the school’s staff, owns the school’s land and buildings and has 
primary responsibility for deciding the arrangements for admitting pupils. In the case of 
oversubscription, the most commonly used criteria for admissions are a siblings rule and proximity 
to the school.5 Most other primary schools are faith schools. In some cases, these schools have 
greater autonomy from the Local Authority and an obligation to raise part of the capital funding 
(‘Voluntary Aided schools’). Also, oversubscription criteria include affiliation to the religious 
denomination of the school. We restrict our attention to children attending Community schools as 
they are more homogenous in their funding, governance and admissions structure and thus easier 
to match across Local Authority boundaries. 
 
Most funding to schools goes through Local Authorities (of which there are 150). Over the period 
relevant to this study, most funding gets allocated to Local Authorities using a national formula and 
then Local Authorities each use their own formula to allocate this funding to schools.6  When the 
funding gets to schools, it is for the school to decide how to use it, although the bulk of expenditure 
is on teacher pay which follows national pay scales. The broad allocation of spending is as follows: 
60% on teachers; 20% on support staff or other staff; 6% on building and maintenance; 5% on 
learning resources/IT and 8% on a residual category. This has changed little over time (Holmlund et 
al. 2010). 
 
Key features of national funding is that there is a basic allocation per pupil, with an allowance made 
for area (‘area cost adjustment’), sparsity, additional educational needs and ‘high cost’ pupils.7  
There have been some changes to the formulae over time (as documented in West, 2008). For 
                                                     
5
 The Schools Admission Codes sets out rules for admissions criteria. Notably, student ability or family income cannot 
be used as a criterion. 
6
 There has been a recent move to give many more schools autonomy. In this case funding will come directly from 
central government rather than through the Local Authority. However, this initiative is very recent and does not affect 
most schools in our sample. 
7
 Some of the indicators used to measure additional education needs and ‘high cost’ pupils have changed over time. An 
example of what counts as ‘additional educational needs’ is the proportion of children who do not speak English as a 
first language; measures of deprivation. Indicators used for ‘high cost’ are the proportion of children with a low birth 
weight and the proportion of adults on income support in the Local Authority.  
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example, in 2006/07 the funding formula changed to the ‘Dedicated School Grant’.  However, this 
was based on similar principles to the earlier formula (including adjustments for area and 
educational need) but introduced greater complexity, with additional funding strands to support 
national educational priorities.  
 
We are mainly concerned with the aspect of the national formula relating to the ‘area cost 
adjustment’. This reflects two kinds of difference between areas in costs: differences in labour 
costs (i.e. the main factor) and differences in business rates paid on local authority premises. The 
‘labour cost adjustment’ is based on the differences in wage costs between areas. The underlying 
rationale is that local authorities have to compete for staff with other employers and therefore 
need to pay the local ‘going rate.8 This is worked out by applying regression analysis to the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings. An index of ‘labour cost adjustment’ factors are then produced and 
used in the formula to allocate education resources from central government to local authorities. 
However, this extra funding does not necessarily get passed on to teachers as they get paid 
according to national pay scales – with very limited regional variation.9 Unsurprising this has 
provoked considerable controversy over time. For example, a recent newspaper article reports a 
review of the situation of a Local Authority in London (Haringey): ‘under the current system, the 
borough is treated as outer London even though the challenges its schools faces and its teachers 
pay are in line with the inner-city areas like Camden, Hackney and Islington. It means each pupil in 
Haringey received £1,300 less in funding per pupil…’10 We make use of this funding anomaly to 
identify the effect of school expenditure on similar schools either side of an administrative 
boundary. Further detail on the mechanics of the ‘area cost adjustment’ is described in the section 
below.  
 
 
                                                     
8
 See http://www.local.odpm.gov.uk/finance/0708/acameth.pdf 
9
 There are four scales according to geography: Inner London; Outer London; ‘The Fringe’ (i.e. a small number of areas 
that are within largely rural Local Authorities); and the rest of England and Wales. These differentials in teacher pay do 
not correspond to the ‘area cost adjustment’. The former is more refined (i.e. there are many areas) and much larger than 
differences in teacher pay across these regions. Nonetheless, differences in teacher pay across areas can be a cause of 
resentment (e.g. if they work in Inner London rather than Outer London) since teachers do not necessarily live in the 
Local Authority where they teach. 
10
http://www.haringeyindependent.co.uk/news/education/8863493.Gove_promises_to_consider__unfair_funding__for_
Haringey_schools/. 18 February 2011 
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3 Data 
 
 
Our study is based on the National Pupil Database (a census of all students in state schools) 
between 2002 and 2009. The data set contains information on the national test scores of all 11 
year olds in England (i.e. at the end of Key Stage 2) in English, Maths and Science. As there is no 
grade repetition in the English system, all pupils are in the same year group. We use the average 
score across these subjects as our outcome variable. We also investigate the impact of school 
expenditure on each subject separately.  
 
The National Pupil Database also has information on the prior attainment of each person - age 7 
tests (i.e. at the end of Key Stage 1) in reading, maths and science. Demographic information 
included in the data set relates to gender, ethnicity, whether English is his/her first language, 
whether the pupil is known to be eligible for Free School Meals (an important indicator of socio-
economic disadvantage). Geographic information on the pupil’s home residence is also available at 
‘output area’ (i.e. small geographic clusters of households).11 This can be linked to local house 
prices (from the Land Registry) and an index of income deprivation: the IDACI index (i.e. Income 
Deprivation Affecting Children: calculates the proportion of children under the age of 16 that live in 
low income households) The individual-level data can also be linked to school-level information in 
the Annual School Census (such as pupil numbers; the proportion of pupils eligible for Free School 
Meals in the School) and financial data on schools (from the ‘Consistent Financial Reporting’ data 
set). This contains detailed information on school expenditure and income sources. 
 
We have information on national funding formula over time for Local Authorities. This includes 
how funding is allocated on the basis of Additional Educational Needs (AEN) and the ‘Area Cost 
Adjustment’. In primary schools the AEN index is based on a weighting according to the number of 
children of families receiving various types of benefit (i.e. Income Support/Job Seekers Allowance; 
Working Families Tax Credit) and the proportion of pupils who do not speak English as a first 
language.  
                                                     
11
 The recommended size for ‘output areas’ is 125 households. There are 175,434 OAs in England. They are based on the 
2001 Census. 
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The ‘Area Cost Adjustment’ (ACAs) is fundamental to our empirical strategy. The ACAs are 
produced by the department of Communities and Local Government, and the methodology is 
discussed in CLG (2007). As discussed above, ACAs reflect two kinds of difference between areas in 
costs: differences in labour costs (the Labour Cost Adjustment, LCA) and differences in business 
rates paid on local authority premises (the Rates Cost Adjustment, RCA). The Labour Cost 
Adjustment component is estimated from wage regressions estimated on a large national sample 
of employees – the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Essentially, log wages are regressed on a 
set of individual characteristics (including occupational controls, age, gender, industry) and 
geographical area fixed effects. The LCAs are then estimated as wage indices from the area fixed 
effects. For determining the education ACA, the RCA and LCA are weighted by according to the 
estimated contribution of labour (80%) and rates (between around 1% and 2% ) to education costs, 
so the LCA is by far the most important factor and the rates adjustment is inconsequential. For 
example, the RCA for Inner London for the 2008/9 index was 1.63 and the LCA was 1.32, but the 
Inner London overall ACA is 1.271 (see CLG 2007, 2005). Oddly, a lower limit is applied such that 
the ACAs are lower-truncated at the mean, such that areas with an average or lower than average 
wage index are given an  ACA of 1. Areas with a higher than average wage index are assigned the 
actual estimated value (e.g. 1.1. if the index is 10% above the mean). The logic of for this truncation 
is not completely clear, but arguments appear to be political and have to do with not wanting to 
‘penalise’ low wage areas with lower central government funding allocations. 
 
We have this education ACA data for every year. The ACAs have the following consequences for 
real per-pupil funding differences between neighbouring schools in adjacent LAs. Firstly the ACAs 
are derived from national wage data on the private and public sectors (the New Earnings 
Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings series), but teacher pay is highly regulated by union 
bargaining at the national level and so does not vary between labour markets in the same way as 
wages in general. Secondly, the ACAs are defined for sub-regional geographical units that are 
aggregates of LAs, so neighbouring LAs can receive different levels of per-pupil funding simply 
because they have been allocated to different ACA regions. All these factors together can lead 
similar neighbouring schools in adjacent LAs to receive very different levels of per pupil funding, 
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and it is these cross-boundary differences in LA funding and ACAs that we exploit in our empirical 
analysis. 
 
To set up these data for our empirical analysis, we carry out a number of data manipulations using 
a Geographical Information System, computing distances between each school and its nearest 
neighbours based on the school postcode coordinates, distances to Local Authority boundaries. We 
also derive a subset of LA boundaries that do not coincide with geographical features (major roads, 
motorways, railways) using feature data from the Ordnance Survey (these geographical data were 
obtained from the UKBORDERS and Digimap services at www.edina.ac.uk). 
 
 
4 Empirical Strategy 
 
 
General principles 
 
 
The central aim of the empirical research is to answer this question of whether additional school 
resources raise student achievement, with a particular focus on low-income, low achieving children 
in urban schools. All research that aims to answer this  question has to address concerns that any 
estimated statistical association between resources and achievement is not causal. These concerns 
arise because the resources a school receives are dependent on the characteristics of the school, 
neighbourhood and its student intake, which are in turn correlated with student achievement. 
 
To solve this identification problem, we employ a research design that combines elements of 
matching, regression discontinuity and instrumental variables. This design makes use of funding 
differentials that occur for similar schools located on opposite sides of Local Authority (school 
district) boundaries. These funding differentials arise because central government funding 
formulae pay out different per-pupil grants to Local Authorities (LAs), on the basis of average LA 
demographics and the wages in the labour market in which the LA is assumed to operate. In turn, 
LAs distribute these grants to schools, but not in ways that compensate for the specific 
circumstances of each school in their jurisdiction. Schools in adjacent LAs but close to the boundary 
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will tend to be more similar to each other in terms of neighbourhood, intake and labour market 
than they are to the LA as a whole. On account of being located on either side of the boundary, 
they will receive differential funding from their respective LAs even though they operate in very 
similar contexts. As discussed above, this funding anomaly is particularly pertinent with respect to 
the Area Cost Adjustments (ACAs) that are used in central government formulae to compensate for 
wage differentials across labour markets, since neighbouring schools can receive very different per-
pupil resources to compensate for inter-labour market wage differentials, even though close 
neighbouring schools are, self-evidently, in the same labour market and face the same prices for 
labour and other inputs12. Our method therefore uses these discontinuities in LA funding, and 
discontinuities in the ACA indices, as instruments for differences in school expenditure across LA 
boundaries.  
 
 
A more formal exposition 
 
 
Our empirical estimates centre on estimating the parameter β in regression models of the form 
Yisjt= βEsjt + µst + θg + εisjt        (1) 
where Y is student i's key stage 2 test score (an average across three subjects, Maths, Science and 
English) at the end of primary school (age 11), Esjt is a measure of per-student, current expenditure 
in school s, located in neighbourhood j, in the years leading up to year t13. Optional control 
variables (e.g. for pupil background and prior achievements) can be included, but we suppress 
these in the notation for simplicity. Pupil achievement is, in part, determined by unobserved school 
effects (µst), neighbourhood effects (θg) and a standard random error term (εisjt). School 
expenditure is endogenous to pupil performance (Y), because it is correlated with these school and 
neighbourhood effects through central government and LA funding decisions, and because of 
schools' own fund raising and expenditure decisions. Note, our empirical analysis will allow that 
these neighbourhood effects to vary by year, but we suppress this for notational simplicity. So, the 
                                                     
12
 In some areas, the wages schools have to pay their teachers are higher in high-ACA areas due to the London weighting 
on pay scales as discussed in footnote 9, but in general it is up to school management to decide whether they use 
additional resources on teacher pay or other expenditure items.. 
13
 We use means in the 4 preceding years, spanning the key stage 2 phase in primary education 
- 10 - 
fundamental identification problem in estimating the coefficient β, interpreted as the causal linear 
effect of resources on achievement, is that school resources Esjt are correlated with µst + θg. 
 
To assist with understanding our empirical strategy, it is useful to write out a representation of the 
process determining school expenditure in terms of its essential components: 
Esjt = α1fst +α2gjt +α3hlt        (2) 
where α1fst represents school fund raising, (and school-level decisions about borrowing and saving), 
α2gjt represents income allocated to the school by the LA in relation to its neighbourhood location 
and expected intake, and α3hlt represents LA average per-pupil income from central government 
grant. The last component is determined by central government funding formulae, which are based 
on a national per-pupil baseline expenditure (clt) and additional components to compensate for LA 
educationally relevant demographics (zlt - mainly families on Income Support, children with English 
as an Additional Language, and families with  Working Families Tax Credits and wage costs ACAlt) 
i.e. 
hlt = clt + zlt + acalt        (3a) 
Esjt = α1fst +α2gjt + clt + zlt + acalt      (3b) 
 
Our estimation strategy for (1) is a differencing-based, discontinuity design, combined with an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach using instruments explicit in equation (3).14 This strategy uses 
cross-sectional differences in the funding formula over closely spaced schools, and changes in the 
funding formula over time that (we argue) are uncorrelated with changes in factors affecting these 
schools. We firstly eliminate neighbourhood factors common to neighbouring schools using a 
within-groups fixed effect estimator to difference out θg, in which the groups j are defined by 
clusters of neighbouring schools (which we discuss later). This yields differenced versions of (1) and 
(3): 
DYisjt= βDEsjt + {Dµst + Dεisjt}       (4a) 
DEsjt = α1Dfst + Dhlt         (4b) 
                                                     
14
 One fixed-effect method would be to difference equation (1) over time in a standard panel data estimator. This is the 
approach used by Holmlund, McNally and Viarengo (2010) using similar data to ours. However, there is very little 
variation over time in the ACAs used in this study, so time differencing is inappropriate in our context. 
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where the D represents the within - j transformation. This is not an effective strategy for the full set 
of  schools, because the differences in central government grants to LAs are zero by construction 
within LAs (Dhlt in 4b). In addition, neighbouring schools, with similar characteristics, within the 
same LA probably receive very similar levels of funding delegated from the LA. Therefore, a large 
proportion of the residual variation in funding differences between schools within the same LA in 
equation (4a) would be due to school-level decisions, or components of LA-delegated funding that 
relate to school attributes which are not controlled by spatial differencing. Both of these 
components are potentially correlated with the school-by-year effects (fst). 
 
However, building on the boundary regression discontinuity design literature (Black 1999 etc.), we 
can exploit the discontinuity in school funding between neighbouring schools across LA boundaries, 
arising from Dhlt, for the subset of schools that share the same geographical neighbourhoods but 
are on opposite sides of the LA boundary. The idea is then to use these core differences in funding 
between LAs (Dhlt) as a source of exogenous variation with which to identify β in equation (4a). 
 
We will present a number of estimates based on this research in our empirical results. Firstly we 
present estimates of equation (4a). On its own, this is still ineffective, because there remain 
differences in school expenditure decisions which are  correlated with the school-by-year fixed 
effects (Dfst) due to unobserved differences between schools that are not fully controlled by the 
discontinuity design. One solution is to replace school-level expenditure differences (DEsjt) with LA 
level average expenditure per-pupil differences, thus eliminating school-specific expenditure 
components. However, our estimate of  β then yields an estimate of the response of pupil 
achievement to LA- average expenditure, rather than school-specific expenditure. Our preferred 
strategy is to use the instruments explicit in the funding mechanism. 
 
A second solution, therefore, would be to use LA-level income differences from central government 
(Dhlt) as an instrument for school-level expenditure differences (DEsjt). However, due to changes in 
the central government funding system, we do not directly observe a central government grant to 
primary schools after 2005/6.15  However, we can use the mean income delegated by LAs to 
                                                     
15
 After this year, central government did not provide a ring-fenced grant to LAs for primary school spending but 
switched to a block grant to cover all types and phases of school (the Dedicated Schools Grant) 
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schools within their jurisdiction  as a potential instrument, since this is free of school-specific 
components (Dfst) and determined, for the most part, directly by the grant from central 
government.  
 
There is still some danger in using cross-boundary differences in LA funds delegated to schools as 
an instrument in this context, because this could in part indicate differences between LAs in terms 
of demographics, administrative effectiveness and strategic direction which are not effectively 
controlled for by the boundary discontinuity design. We will partly address this issue by matching 
schools according to a measure of disadvantage (i.e. the proportion of children eligible to receive 
Free School Meals in the school), as well as by geographical proximity when forming our 
neighbourhood clusters j. We can also control for the index of Additional Educational Needs (AEN) 
used in the formula that determines funding to LAs. However, an alternative solution is to use the 
differences in Area Cost Adjustments (Dacalt) between LAs as instruments for the differences in 
school-level expenditure. The identifying assumptions are that the differences in the ACAs between 
neighbouring schools, across LA boundaries, are correlated with differences in school expenditure, 
but uncorrelated with differences in the characteristics of schools and their students. These 
assumptions seem plausible given that the ACAs are intended to compensate LAs for differences in 
labour costs, and yet closely neighbouring schools are self-evidently in the same labour market. 
 
 
Defining matched k-school clusters 
 
 
We now explain how we define school 'neighbourhood' clusters (j) and implement the fixed effects 
estimator in (4a/b). To create a matched school cluster of size k, we take an 'origin' Community 
school and match it to its nearest k-1 neighbouring Community schools in an adjacent LA by year, 
where these neighbours are within 2km straight line distance and fall within 5 percentiles of the 
origin school in the distribution of proportion of Free School Meal (FSM) students. The intention 
here is primarily to match schools in terms of neighbourhood j and basic school type, allowing us to 
eliminate unobserved neighbourhood and school-type fixed effects (including labour market 
effects). However, additional matching by FSM also eliminates potential differences in FSM 
proportions, which may reflect LA-average FSM differentials and hence enter into the between-LA 
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funding differences, or may result in differential funds being allocated to schools within LAs (e.g. if 
some LAs provide compensating resources to disadvantaged schools). 
 
We do this matching for all Community schools, but exclude any cases in which there are zero FSM-
matched schools within 2km. The maximal value of k we will use is 8 (implying we match each 
school to its nearest 7 schools). The minimum value of k we use is 2, implying we match each origin 
school to its nearest school across the LA boundary. These k schools are 'stacked' in a panel format, 
and students assigned to their corresponding schools to create a student level data set. So each 
student in an 'origin' school s' in a k-school cluster becomes grouped with other students in the 
nearest k-1, FSM-matched schools in adjacent LAs. This student may appear again in the dataset, 
because the 'origin' school s' may appear as a matched school for another origin school s'' in an 
adjacent LA. The origin school identifiers s', s'' etc. serve as identifiers for the  school clusters j in 
the within-groups regression (4a/b). In addition, the same schools (but with different students and 
different expenditures) appear in our data in different years. 
 
Clearly, this setup generates a complex data and error structure, with implications for the 
estimated standard errors on the regression coefficients. For this reason, we make our standard 
errors robust to arbitrary correlation in the unobservables within LA boundary groups, by standard 
'clustered' standard error methods. These LA boundary error clusters are groups of schools for 
which the same pair of LAs appears for either the 'origin' or 'matched' school. Clustering the 
standard errors in this way allows for error autocorrelation induced by the repeated observations 
in the data setup, caused by spatial autocorrelation along LA boundaries, or serial correlation 
within schools, over time. 
 
One important point to note is that this research design creates a selected sub-sample of schools 
and students: those Community schools that are located close to LA boundaries and have k-1 
matchable Community schools within 2km. The schools in these boundary sub-samples are likely to 
be primarily urban (given the greater density of schools and LA boundaries within urban areas), 
with all thit entails in terms of student demographics and school context. To the extent that the 
effects of expenditure are heterogenous across school and pupil types, the results we present are  
specific to schools and students of the type in our boundary sample, rather than the general 
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population, which motivates our specific research focus on disadvantaged students in urban 
schools. This is an inevitable consequence of any research design that isolates specific non-random 
subgroups in the population in order to construct counterfactuals (including most regression 
discontinuity designs). Our additional results on heterogeneity by student and school type (see 
section 0 below) shed further light on the generalisability of the findings. 
 
 
Evaluating the strategy and instruments 
 
 
The identifying assumption in our preferred IV strategy is that the differences in the ACAs between 
neighbouring schools, across LA boundaries (and within boundaries over time16) are correlated with 
differences in school expenditure, but uncorrelated with differences (and changes) in the 
characteristics of schools and their students. Our alternative IV strategy assumes that difference 
between the average grant paid by LAs to its schools and the average grant paid by an adjacent LA 
to its schools is uncorrelated with the differences in characteristics between neighbouring schools 
in these adjacent LAs.  We present a number of tests of these assumptions. Firstly, we look at how 
sensitive our estimates of β are to the inclusion of control variables for student demographics and 
prior achievements (namely test scores at age 7, key stage 1), and other components in the central 
government school funding formula (zlt in equation 3a/b). Secondly we present 'balancing' tests to 
show that instruments are uncorrelated with differences in student characteristics across LA 
boundaries. These balancing tests involve testing for zero coefficients in a series of regressions of 
student and student neighbourhood characteristics on ACAs, using school-by-year aggregated data, 
transformed to deviations from school-cluster means (as in the main regressions). 
 
A further potential threat to our identification strategy, often raised as a criticism of studies that 
use administrative boundaries as a source of discontinuity, is that the administrative boundaries 
coincide with physical features such as roads and railways that bisect geographical areas into 
distinct communities, so that the neighbouring schools in adjacent LAs are not in practice in the 
same neighbourhoods, and the neighbourhoods may differ on unobservable dimensions. To assess 
                                                     
16
 This constitutes only a small part of the variation in our data. 
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this hypothesis, we re-estimate our main instrumental variable specifications using the sub sample 
of schools that are separated by boundaries that do not coincide with railways, major roads, or 
motorways (our boundary sample already excludes schools separated by major coastal water 
features such as estuaries).17  
 
 
Extensions to the main methods 
 
 
In addition to the baseline estimates of β in our LA boundary sub-sample we offer a number of 
extensions which potentially lead to additional insights into which students benefit and in what 
ways they benefit from additional funding. In particular, we are interested in whether additional 
funding is more effective for some students than others, and more effective in some school 
contexts than in others, and whether it has more impact on some subjects than others. To this end, 
we estimate regressions separately for students in different demographic categories (FSM, non-
FSM, boys, girls, white, non-white, high and low prior achievement - ks1 scores). In all these cases, 
our estimates can only partially answer our questions because we do not have expenditure split by 
subject area, nor do we know on which students the money is being spent. Hence, the estimates 
depend on both the response of outcomes in a given category (subject, or student type) to 
expenditure in that category, and on the way that schools, on average, allocate their expenditure 
between these categories (i.e. how much of additional expenditure goes into maths teaching 
relative to English, or into lower achieving children relative to high achieving children). Mo re 
concretely, we can answer questions about how achievements in schools in different contexts 
respond to increased expenditure by splitting our sample into different school types, estimating 
regressions separately for schools with above/below median proportions FSM, above/below 
median indices of student's residential neighbourhood deprivation (IDACI indices - see the data 
section), and above/below median average ks1 scores. Finally, we re-estimate our IV estimates of 
equation (4a/b) separately for ks2 Maths, Science and English tests. 
 
 
                                                     
17
 We find those sections of the LA boundaries that ‘intersect’ primary roads, railways, and motorways and drop school 
clusters which have these boundary sections as their nearest LA boundary. 
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Evidence on expenditure patterns 
 
 
Using our methods, it is not possible to estimate what types of expenditure are most or least 
effective in raising achievements, because we do not have sufficient instruments to identify 
separate causal effects for different expenditure categories. We do, however, provide some 
insights by looking at how the overall funding differences affect spending in various categories 
using the detailed breakdown available in our school expenditure data. This is achieved by 
estimating a set of expenditure share equations similar to (4a/b) at school-by-year level, but 
replacing test scores with expenditure shares as the dependent variable, and using LA-income 
differences as instruments for school total expenditure. This approach is similar to that commonly 
used for estimating household consumption ‘Engel curves’ in the consumption literature, where 
the equations would typically include additional controls for goods’ prices. In our case we use the 
school-cluster fixed effects to control for prices: that is we are comparing expenditures in closely 
spaced schools, which we assume face identical prices for their inputs.   
 
 
5 Results 
 
 
Description of the sample 
 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the full national sample and the boundary sample based on 
4-school clusters, which will form the basis for most of our analysis (though we will report results 
for alternative sized clusters). Figure 1 maps the schools in this sub-sample. The full sample is not 
used in the empirical analysis and is shown only for comparison purposes. As we have discussed, 
our research design brings the focus on urban schools, the boundary sample being predominantly 
urban because of the greater density of boundaries and schools in urban areas. This urban sample, 
has higher levels of per-student spending (£3689 compared to £3256 on average at 2009 prices), 
higher levels of income from the central government grant (£2889 compared to £2589), and a 
higher Area Cost Adjustment index. Children in the boundary schools are more likely to be on Free 
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School Meals, less likely to speak English as a first language and less likely to be White British, 
reflecting their urban locations. The table also summarises the distances between our matched 
schools in the 4-school cluster boundary sub-sample. The schools are on average close to each 
other (less than 1.4km apart) and less than 500 metres from the LA boundary. 
 
The lower two panels of Table 1 shows how the expenditure and income data looks when we 
difference across LA boundaries, for schools in the 4-school cluster boundary sample. In the middle 
panel, the data is collapsed to s-LA-s'-LA cells, where s and s' are the matched school identifiers. 
The reported statistics relate to the residuals from within-group regressions of the expenditure 
variables on an s-lea fixed effect. The means are therefore zero, by construction, but the standard 
deviations show the cross-sectional variation in expenditure across LA boundaries. The lower panel 
repeats this analysis, but on s-LA-by-s’-LA-by-year cells, and shows the cross sectional variation 
across LA boundaries, combined with the time series variation within and across boundaries. 
Looking at the middle panel, we see one standard deviation in the differences in between-LA 
school expenditure for schools in the 4-school clusters is £349. One standard deviation in between-
LA expenditure differences (that is the mean expenditure in schools in the neighbouring LAs, 
irrespective of whether these schools are close to the boundary or not) is less, at £271. There is 
also substantial variation in the income to schools from the LA across the LA boundaries, which will 
provide the cross-sectional variation for our first instrument in the IV regression analysis. The 
standard deviation of £209 is about 50% of the standard deviation in the un-differenced boundary 
sample in the upper panel. The last row in the middle panel shows the predicted expenditure 
differentials when the expenditure is predicted from the ACA index differentials between LAs i.e. 
our second preferred instrument. This is £110.80. In summary, the raw cross-sectional differences 
in income from LAs to the boundary schools are quite substantial and about 53% (i.e. 110.80/209.3) 
of this is attributable to the ACA (i.e. about 28% of the variance is due to the ACA differential). In 
the main results, we exploit variation in these expenditure variables and instruments over time, as 
well as the cross-sectional variation indicated in the middle panel. The corresponding descriptive 
statistics in the bottom panel indicate (by comparison with the middle panel) that 75-90% of the 
variance in the LA-income and ACA variables is cross-sectional and will provide the main source of 
variation in our data. 
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Figures 2 and 3 provide more detail on our instrumental variables. Figure 2 shows the Area Cost 
Adjustments for LAs as they were in 2002 and 2009. The figure is arranged so that the 2002 
adjustments are shown below the horizontal axis and the 2009 adjustments above the axis. Also, 
for presentational convenience, we have subtracted 1 from the actual value of the indices. This 
picture allows us to see where the identification will come from in our IV estimates that make use 
of these ACAs. Our IV strategy uses differentials between adjacent LAs in a given year (e.g. Haringey 
and Hackney in 2009 and in 2002), differences between neighbouring LAs in different years (e.g. 
comparing Haringey in 2009 with Hackney in 2002) and differences for a school in a given LA over 
time (e.g. the change in the ACA for Hackney). The distribution of the instruments is shown in more 
detail in Figure 3. These are the distributions of the data shown in the bottom panel of Table 1. 
 
 
Regression results 
 
 
Table 2a presents the first part of our central regression results, which relate to equations (4a), 
estimated by least squares methods without any instruments. Each coefficient and standard error 
is from a separate regression and show the change in standardised student test scores for a £1000 
of additional per-student expenditure. There are four horizontal panels in the table, for different 
sized clusters starting with matched pairs (2-school clusters) and moving to 8-school clusters in the 
bottom panel. Looking across the table, there are six different specifications, in three pairs. The 
first column in each pair shows results without any control variables. The second column in each 
pair includes controls for student characteristics (FSM, ethnic group dummies, gender, month of 
birth, English first language, distance to the LA boundary and ks1 test scores, and the LA-level index 
of Additional Educational Needs used in the central government funding formula). 
 
For reference purposes, the first pair (column 1 and 2) presents simple OLS estimates on the 
boundary subsamples, but without school cluster fixed effects (i.e. the data is not differenced 
across boundaries as implied by equation 4a). Due to the needs-based resource allocation to 
schools (both from central government to LAs and from LAs to schools) the coefficients in the 
uncontrolled regressions (column 1) are negative and significant and cannot be interpreted as 
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causal estimates. Column 2 adds in the control variables set, which drives the coefficient towards 
zero (and insignificance), as we would expect since these variables at least partially control for the 
factors that jointly determine resource allocation and student achievement. 
 
The second pair (columns 3 and 4) relates to a k-school-cluster fixed-effect regression of ks2 scores 
on school-level expenditures, where expenditure is an average over the preceding 4 years before 
the tests (i.e. equation 4a, with no instruments). The estimates in these specifications are negative, 
and, with no control variables, become significant as we move down the table to differences based 
on larger clusters. Controlling for student characteristics in column 2 renders all the estimates 
statistically insignificant. As discussed in section 4.2, these regression discontinuity design-based 
estimates use between school variation in expenditure that is still potentially correlated with 
unobserved school characteristics, when these characteristics are not effectively controlled for by 
the discontinuity-design. One reason for this failure in the discontinuity design is that schools will 
differ in their ability to attract additional funding from non-central sources (charities, events, 
special LA grants) for reasons that do not necessarily relate to geographical location, such as head 
teacher and staff motivation and effectiveness in fund raising, or random variation in student 
intakes that attract additional funding (e.g. children with diagnosed additional needs). A second 
reason is that the matched schools are not perfectly co-located and so potentially not perfectly 
matched on unobserved characteristics of their student intake. These estimates therefore cannot 
be interpreted as causal. 
 
Columns 5 and 6 report the results when we use average LA primary school expenditure per 
student in place of school-level expenditure, thus mitigating the biases induced by school-specific 
unobservables. The coefficients become large, positive and statistically significant (except where 
we compare nearest school pairs in row 1). They are generally quite insensitive to the size of the 
school-cluster used, and whether or not control variables are included, although the coefficients 
are much more precise in the 4 to 8-school clusters, when we compare a school with more schools 
than just its nearest neighbour. The effect sizes imply that an increase of £1000 in average per-
student spending in the LA as whole is associated with between 0.10 and 0.18 of a standard 
deviation increase in student achievement at ks2. However, these estimates make it hard to judge 
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the effect of additional spending at the school level, in that they do not adjust for the relationship 
between spending in the boundary schools and spending in the LA on average. 
 
Table 2b, provides the instrumental variables estimates of equations (4a/b). Note that we report 
the first stage F-statistics for the IV results. All of these are acceptable in terms of usual criteria for 
the strength of the instruments. Column 1,2 and 5,6 use school level mean income delegated to the 
school from the LA as the instrument (CFR category IO1, funds delegated by the LA). Columns 3,4 
and 7,8 use the ACA index as an instrument. Columns 1,2 and 3,4 use the boundary subsample, but 
without cluster fixed effects, so do not exploit cross-boundary differences. We report these results 
in order to demonstrate that we need both differencing across boundaries and instrumental 
variables as a fully effective strategy. To see this, note that the IV estimates without fixed effects 
and without any control variables are negative and significant, and not so different from the OLS 
estimates. For similar reasons to the OLS estimates in Table 2a, this occurs because the LA funding-
based instruments are correlated with the characteristics of schools that also determine school 
performance, due to needs based funding rules. Once we include control variables to partially 
adjust the estimates for these school characteristics, the estimates become positive and significant. 
However, it remains difficult to judge to what extent simply controlling for school characteristics in 
this way is an effective strategy.  
 
Columns 5,6 and 7,8 combine the instrumental variables and cross-boundary differencing 
strategies. These IV estimates are all considerably larger in magnitude than the IV estimates that do 
not exploit only cross-boundary differences (columns 1-4). They are also, in most, cases, higher 
than the estimates in Table 2a column 5 and 6 that used cross-boundary differences, but no 
instruments. A crucial thing to note, both from Table 2a columns 5 and 6, and from Table 2b 
columns 5-8, is that the strategy of comparing funding differentials arising from LA-sources in 
closely spaced matched schools across LA boundaries seems to be effective in eliminating the 
biases induced by needs-based resourcing, because the estimates are much less sensitive to the 
inclusion of our set of control variables. The implication is that the LA-based funding instruments 
are uncorrelated with other factors determining pupil achievement (and we provide more evidence 
on this in the balancing tests below). In fact, for the LA-income instrumental variables estimates in 
columns 6 and 7 (where the instrument is the average grant paid from the LA to the schools within 
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its control), the point estimates are almost identical with, and without any control variables. The 
ACA-index based IV estimates are more sensitive, and the conditional estimates in columns 8 are 
around 50% higher than the unconditional estimates in column 7, although this difference is less 
than 2 standard errors.    
 
The estimates from the 4 to 8-school clusters are again much more precise than in the 2-school 
clusters, and range from around 0.16 to 0.32. All are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or 
better, except for the specification in the top row of column 7. Although the IV estimates based on 
the ACA indices are potentially preferable on theoretical grounds, given they isolate a specific 
source of variation in funding, the LA-income based IV estimates yield more stable and statistically 
significant estimates. These LA-income IV estimates are not highly sensitive to the choice of school 
cluster size, nor to the control variable set. They have higher first stage F-statistics, which is to be 
expected given the greater variation shown in Figure 2. Overall, the IV results indicate that an 
additional £1000 per student paid to schools in these urban LA boundary settings, raised student 
test scores at ks2 by around 0.25 standard deviations. 
 
In these main specifications, identification of the expenditure effects comes from variation in 
expenditure across boundaries, and over time within the school-cluster. The point estimates are 
higher still if we control for school-cluster-by-year fixed effects such that we estimate using only 
the cross–sectional variation in expenditure, although the difference is less than one standard error 
– see Appendix Table A1. 
 
 
Evaluating the identification strategy: balancing tests 
 
 
Table 3a and 3b report the balancing tests described in section 0. These results assess whether 
students  and schools, that are in LAs with high income levels (Table 3a) or are subject to high ACAs 
(Table 3b) have different characteristics than those on the opposite side of LA boundaries that are 
subject to lower LA incomes and ACAs. The upper panel of each table shows estimates equivalent 
to the IV regression of Table 2b, columns 5 and 7, for 4-school clusters, but with the dependent 
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variable replaced by various student characteristics as set out in the table columns. The lower 
panel shows coefficients from regressions of the same characteristics using data in the boundary 
sub-sample,  aggregated to school cells. Both sets of regressions include school-cluster and year 
fixed effects. The top set of results in each panel shows the case with no control variables. The 
lower set of results shows the coefficients when we include a control for the LA-level Additional 
Educational Needs index that is used in the central government funding formula (this variable is in 
the control variable set in the odd-numbered columns of Table 2a/b). Including this control ensures 
that the variation in grants used to identify the impact of expenditure comes primarily from 
variation in the Area Cost Adjustments which is uncorrelated with other LA-specific disadvantages. 
 
For the most part, these balancing tests show that schools along LA boundaries that are exposed to 
different LA-incomes and ACAs do not have markedly different characteristics. There is no 
association between these instruments and early school achievements (ks1 at age 7), age, gender, 
English as first language, ethnicity18, or residential deprivation in the student level or school-level 
regressions. There is no association with school size (student numbers) or the average of students' 
residential neighbourhood house prices in the school level regression. 
 
The one obvious dimension on which the schools exposed to different LA-incomes and ACAs  do 
not appear to be well balanced is FSM entitlement. In the both the student and school level 
regressions, the coefficient is small, but significant, in the regressions without the LA AEN control. 
The reason for this association is most likely that school funding formulae allocating funds to LAs 
(and potentially to schools within LAs) depend explicitly on the proportions of families on income 
support, which also determines FSM entitlement, and it is hard to break this link in the empirical 
analysis. Indeed, controlling for the LA Additional Educational Needs index – the index of families 
on income support that is used in the funding formula to LAs – in the second row in each panel 
reduces the size of the coefficient and renders it insignificant in the case of the  LA-income 
instrument, and less significant in the case of the ACA instrument. The question is, whether this 
failure of balancing in the uncontrolled estimates is of any consequence for the interpretation of 
Table 2. The positive sign of the coefficient in the FSM specification in Table 3 immediately suggests 
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 There is an association with ethnicity when we do not  control for LA Additional Educational Needs (AEN) in the 
school-by-year level regressions. 
- 23 - 
differential FSM status cannot explain the performance advantages in high-ACA schools, since FSM 
entitlement is also associated with lower ks2 achievement. More specifically, consider that the 
coefficient from a simple regression of standardised ks2 scores in FSM entitlement at student level 
(with no other control variables) is around -0.5. From Table 3, column (4) it can be inferred that a 5-
6 percentage point increase in the probability a student being FSM-entitled is associated with a 
£1000 increase in total school expenditure per pupil. However, this relates to a 0.05*0.5 = 0.025 
standard deviation fall in ks2 scores. This is not a big effect relative to the 0.25 standard deviation 
increase in ks2 scores attributed to £1000 in total expenditure per pupil in Table 2b and is of little 
substantive importance for the main findings on the effects of expenditure on ks2 scores.19 
 
Another reason for potential imperfect balancing across the LA boundary is if LA funding, and 
consequent school funding differentials, encourage sorting of households of different types across 
the boundary. The existence of house price differentials across school catchment area boundaries 
has been demonstrated by other studies and used a source of identification for the effects of 
school quality on house prices (Black 1999, Bayer et al 2010, Gibbons, Machin and Silva 2011), and 
such differentials potentially lead to this kind of sorting. Sorting of wealthier families into the 
neighbourhoods and schools on the side of the boundary with higher ACA-based funding could lead 
to amplification of the direct impacts of these resources. Given the scale of the effects in our 
results, we doubt that house-price related sorting is a major factor. To see this, consider that a one 
standard deviation increase in the ACA index is related to an £111 increase in per-student funding 
per year, which implies an 111/1000 x 0.25 = 0.028 standard deviation increase in student 
performance (where the s.d. is in the student distribution). Given the standard deviation in 
performance across schools is around 30% of the standard deviation in the student distribution, 
this £111 funding differential corresponds to a  0.08 standard deviation differential in school 
performance. A typical estimate from the schools and house prices literature puts the house price 
response to a 1 standard deviation increase in performance at around 3% (e.g. see Gibbons and 
Machin 2008, Black and Machin 2011). Therefore, a 1 standard deviation increase in the ACA index 
would raise house prices by only 0.08*3 = 0.24%, a price differential, or about £480 on a £200000 
property typical at this time. This magnitude of price differential seems unlikely to lead to 
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 Note that repeating this exercise for either 2,6 or 8-school cluster sizes, tends to improve the balancing in terms of 
FSM entitlement, but we report the 'worst case' so that the reader can judge for themselves the scientific credibility of the 
results. 
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substantial educationally-relevant residential sorting. It should also be noted that the balancing 
tests indicate no statistically significant association between the instruments and housing prices, 
nor any association with achievements at age 7, which we would expect also to be affected if the 
results were driven by residential sorting that affected educational achievement. 
 
These results are shown in Table 4 (for the LA income instrument) and are not substantively any 
different from those in Table 2b, indicating that the coincidence of physical features and LA 
boundaries is of little relevance. 
 
 
Heterogeneity by school characteristics and subject 
 
 
Table 5 reports on heterogeneity by school characteristics. The split by school characteristics is 
based on whether or not a school has above or below-mean proportions of various student 
demographic groups. In these results, we use the LA-income instrument, because the ACA-index 
becomes too weak an instrument to give informative results for some of these subgroups, although 
the point estimates are similar (see Appendix A2). The overall story in Table 5 is that the effects of 
expenditure are considerably higher and more significant in schools with more ‘disadvantaged’ 
students. Expenditure appears not to have had an impact in schools with higher proportions of 
whites than average, schools where pupils come less disadvantaged neighbourhoods, nor schools 
where achievement at ks1 is above average. Evidently, expenditure has higher returns in schools 
where there are greater gains to be made at school level. Interestingly, these effects seems to be 
based on the type of school, not the type of student. Appendix A2 presents the breakdown by 
student type, rather than the school characteristics, and there appears to be relatively little 
difference. In other words, all types of students in the most disadvantaged schools appear to 
benefit from additional funding, not just the disadvantaged students, although it is hard to know 
what to conclude from this finding given we have no information on how additional resources were 
split within schools between different student types. 
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Lastly, Table 6 splits the ks2 score into subject areas – maths, science and English. It turns out that 
the strongest effects on achievement arise through scores in maths and science, with English 
showing a more moderate, but still significant response. It is not clear why expenditure effects 
should vary across subject areas. However, Machin et al. (2010) find the same result for a resource-
based programme targeted at secondary schools in disadvantaged urban areas. 
 
 
How was the additional money spent? 
 
 
Although we can say nothing about the causal effects of different spending categories on 
achievement, we show how the expenditure patterns relate to additional income in Table 7, using 
the method set out in Section 0. Our CFR schools expenditure data has a fairly detailed breakdown 
of the expenditure shares in various categories. For presentational simplicity, we aggregate some 
of these categories into 9 groups, teaching expenditure (including temporary agency and ‘supply’ 
staff), support staff (largely teaching assistants and specialist staff to assist with children with 
special needs), other staff (including administrative, catering and premises staff), personal 
development and training, premises (building and grounds maintenance, energy, cleaning, water 
and sewage, rates), learning and ICT resources, ‘bought in professional services’ (which includes 
various types of consultancy, self employed music teachers,  legal advice etc.), supplies (including 
catering and administrative supplies) and other costs (which include insurance costs, financial items 
such as loan interest and transfers to the capital budget). 
 
The bottom row of Table 7 shows the mean expenditure shares in these categories (in the 
boundary sub-sample) over 2004-2009. More than half the budget goes on teaching staff, and just 
under 80% on direct staff costs in total. Non-staff items are each a relatively small share of the 
total. The coefficients in row 1 of the table are the effect of an additional £1000 in total school 
expenditure per student on the share of expenditure in each category. Clearly, all these effects are 
quite small, with an additional £1000 per student reducing the share spent on teachers by 3.7 
percentage points. This is compensated for by an increase in the share spent on learning and ICT 
resources, professional services and supplies. These results tend to indicate that additional income 
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tends to get spent disproportionately on items other than teaching costs, although the changes in 
the shares are small, so the overall impression is that additional income is spread across all 
categories. The indivisibility of teaching expenditures may also contribute to these empirical 
results, given that small expenditure differentials cannot easily be used to employ additional 
teachers (and are difficult to use to attract better teachers given lack of flexibility in teachers pay) 
and so would have to be spent in other ways.  
 
 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
Our findings indicate quite a strong role for general funding increases in raising achievement in 
urban state schools. Perhaps this should not be surprising. However convincing evidence of an 
impact from putting more money into state schools has remained elusive, so our analysis is a useful 
addition to the international academic literature on the economics of schooling. Although we can 
say little about the channels by which money raises achievement, or provide any guide to how the 
money should be spent when it reaches schools, the results are crucially important for higher-level 
policy making. 
 
The findings are particularly pertinent to current education funding proposals in England. The UK 
coalition government’s flagship school funding policy, the Pupil Premium, has started at £430 in 
2010/11 (approx 450 in 2009 prices), and is paid to schools on the basis of the number of 
disadvantaged students (as measured by eligibility to receive free school meals – FSM). The 
government proposes to raise this figure by a factor of 4 by 2014-15. However, FSM students are 
only 25% of the intake in the urban schools in our study, or 17% nationally. Therefore, since the 
Pupil Premium is simply additional funding for schools, and is not necessarily used for resources 
targeted specifically at FSM children, it amounts to additional income of at best about £100 per 
student initially, rising to perhaps £400 by 2014-15 (again at 2009 prices).20 According to our 
                                                     
20
 In fact, the pupil premium policy needs to be viewed in the context of rising inflation and (apart from the premium) no 
nominal increase in funding for schools. Some calculations based on government figures and an inflation rate of 4% 
suggest that although the pupil premium policy will have a redistributional impact, all schools experience a real decrease 
in funding.  
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estimates, an additional £400 per student could be expected to raise ks2 achievement, on average, 
by about 10% of a standard deviation (based on the status quo in terms of all other institutional 
arrangements). A few more back of the envelope calculations (based on estimates in Table 4) 
indicate that, if used specifically for FSM students so that FSM students received an additional 
£2000 in resources, the Pupil Premium at its proposed final level might raise FSM student 
achievement by around 0.5 standard deviations. Probably coincidentally (since as far as we are 
aware such estimates were not used to determine the level of the Pupil Premium), this increase in 
achievement would almost exactly offset the 0.5 standard deviation gap that currently exists 
between FSM and non-FSM students in achievement at ks2, bringing FSM children in line with non-
FSM children (on average). Although doubling the relative resources for FSM children is hard to 
envisage politically, this research suggests that traditional school resources policy have potential to 
largely eliminate the gap.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of schools in the 4-school cluster boundary sub-sample 
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Figure 2: Area Cost Adjustments 
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Note: The 2002 adjustments are shown below the horizontal axis and the 2009 adjustments above the axis. 
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Figure 3: LA income differentials across boundaries (£000s) 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Expenditures are £ per pupil. TO DO 
  Full data set 4-school cluster 
boundary sub-sample 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Student dataset     
Age-11 Total score 0 1.0 -0.024 0.984 
School total expenditure (4 year mean) £3256.40 £644.99 £3689.3 £829.6 
Income from LA grants   (4 year mean) £2589.32 £277.28 £2889.4 £424.8 
ACA index 1.041 0.063 1.112 0.100 
     
Distance to LA boundary (metres)   461.0 509.9 
Distance between paired schools   1354.7 399.5 
Boys 0.509 - 0.505 - 
FSM 0.166 - 0.282 - 
Age in months (within year) 5.471 3.484892 5.524 3.49 
English first language 0.881 - 0.690 - 
White British 0.820 - 0.574 - 
     
Student observations 3318152 34327 
Across-boundary funding differences in LA-
level data set (residuals) 
 Mean s.d. Max 
Total school expenditure  0.000 £349.4 £1341.3 
Mean LA primary expenditure  0.000 £270.5 £1031.3 
Mean income from LA  0.000 £209.3 £951.6 
Mean income predicted from ACA  0.000 £110.8 £404.2 
Across-boundary-over time  funding 
differences in LA-level data set (residuals) 
 Mean s.d. Max 
Total school expenditure  0.000 £440.1 £2185.7 
Mean LA primary expenditure  0.000 £366.3 £1750.0 
Mean income from LA  0.000 £242.7 £116.8 
Mean income predicted from ACA  0.000 £116.0 £477.2 
Observations 
  
1839 in 140 clusters over 5 
yrs 
   
Note: Table reports means and standard deviations 
Four-school cluster for school s composed of up to 3,  s'-schools within 2km of school s, in adjacent school district 
Nearest 3 schools are matched across LA boundaries by FSM (within 5 percentiles) 
Top panel summarises student-level data 
Bottom panel summarises funding differentials in data set collapsed to s-LA-s'-LA cell means. Figures are for residuals from 
regressions of funding variables on s-LA fixed effects. 
Data covers years 2003/4 to 2008/9. Expenditure and income in 2009 prices (deflated by Consumer Price Index) 
 
- 34 - 
Table 2a: Main results on the effects of school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11. Each coefficient is from a separate regression. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
School expenditure 
OLS 
School 
expenditure OLS 
School 
expenditure, 
cluster fixed fx 
School 
expenditure, 
cluster fixed fx 
LA mean 
expenditure, 
cluster fixed fx 
LA mean 
expenditure, 
cluster fixed fx 
Two school clusters        
621 s, 764 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.177*** -0.027 -0.060* 0.009 0.099 0.127* 
1145 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.019) (0.016) (0.024) (0.023) (0.054) (0.055) 
197891 observations        
Four school clusters        
971 s, 1041 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.154*** -0.013 -0.054* 0.019 0.139** 0.179*** 
1969 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.017) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.045) (0.045) 
343237 observations        
Six school clusters        
1057 s, 1073 s’-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.149*** -0.007 -0.065** 0.012 0.141** 0.176*** 
2242 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.017) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019) (0.048) (0.048) 
401701 observations        
Eight school clusters        
1076 s, 1084 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.144*** -0.003 -0.061* 0.011 0.150** 0.176*** 
2358 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.020) (0.047) (0.048) 
429078 observations            
 Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors from student level regressions, 2004-2009 
Regressions in columns (3) to (6) include local cross-boundary k-school-cluster fixed effects 
k-school cluster for school s composed of up to k-1 s'-schools within 2km of school s, in adjacent school district 
Nearest schools are matched across LA boundaries by distance and FSM (within 5 percentiles) 
Dependent variables is standardised mean total score in English, Maths and Science 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within LA boundary pairs 
Significance: ***0.1%, **1%, *5% 
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Table 2b: Main results on the effects of school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11. IV estimates 
Each coefficient is from a separate regression. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  LA income 
IV 
LA income 
IV 
LA ACA  
IV 
LA ACA  
IV 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA ACA IV cross-
boundary 
LA ACA IV cross-
boundary 
Two school clusters          
621 s, 764 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.117*** 0.080** -0.100*** 0.106** 0.180* 0.191* 0.183 0.286* 
1145 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.076) (0.074) (0.119) (0.134) 
197891 observations First stage: F-stat 698.7 368.2 187.5 172.1 107.8 95.59 28.48 25.43 
Four school clusters          
971 s, 1041 s'-schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.092*** 0.088*** -0.078** 0.089*** 0.234*** 0.245*** 0.201* 0.320*** 
1969 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.060) (0.059) (0.086) (0.092) 
343237 observations First stage: F-stat 740.3 375.6 232.6 211.9 220.2 191.7 71.41 66.31 
Six school clusters          
1057 s, 1073 s’-
schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.083*** 0.103*** -0.073** 0.097*** 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.153* 0.275** 
2242 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.064) (0.060) (0.077) (0.088) 
401701 observations First stage: F-stat 860.5 435.0 243.6 188.3 185.1 178.6 93.69 72.58 
Eight school clusters          
1076 s, 1084 s'-
schools Total expenditure 4 yr mean -0.080*** 0.108*** -0.069** 0.102*** 0.256*** 0.244*** 0.163* 0.258** 
2358 s-s' pairs per pupil (1000s) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.062) (0.060) (0.074) (0.083) 
429078 observations First stage: F-stat 911.5 428.1 266.3 181.5 183.8 172.7 104.2 76.54 
 Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors from student level regressions, 2004-2009 
Regressions include local cross-boundary k-school-cluster fixed effects 
k-school cluster for school s composed of up to k-1 s'-schools within 2km of school s, in adjacent school district 
Nearest schools are matched across LA boundaries by distance and FSM (within 5 percentiles) 
Dependent variables is standardised mean total score in English, Maths and Science 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within LA boundary pairs 
Instrument is mean income per pupil from LA (mean in LA as a whole), or Area Cost Adjustment in central government funding formula (see text) 
Significance: ***0.1%, **1%, *5% 
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Table 3a: 'Balancing' tests. LA income instrument 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Standardise
d Age-7 ks1 
tests 
Age 
(months) 
Girls FSM English first 
language 
White Deprivation 
index 
Number of 
students 
Log house 
price 
4-schools: Student level IV          
Total exp pp 4yr -0.014 0.023 0.004 0.041*** -0.070 -0.092 0.047 - - 
Unconditional (0.049) (0.067) (0.008) (0.010) (0.061) (0.058) (0.024)   
          
Total exp pp 4yr -0.023 0.059 0.003 0.023 0.023 0.016 -0.012 - - 
Conditional on LA AEN (0.050) (0.086) (0.009) (0.012) (0.069) (0.062) (0.024)   
 343237 343237 343237 343237 343237 343237 285346   
4-schools: School-level          
LA income 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.017*** -0.039 -0.049* 0.016 -5.919 -0.006 
Unconditional (0.022) (0.033) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.021) (0.012) (10.530) (0.014) 
          
LA income -0.009 0.016 0.001 0.008 -0.000 -0.004 -0.011 -14.089 -0.018 
Conditional on LA AEN (0.022) (0.044) (0.005) (0.005) (0.027) (0.021) (0.011) (10.017) (0.017) 
 8100 8100 8100 8100 8100 8100 6763 8100 8100 
Notes: Regressions of various characteristics on school expenditure variables.  Specifications include school-group fixed effects (4-school clusters) 
Results in top panel are from student-level regressions:  Refer to Table 2 
Results in bottom panel are from regressions on school s-school-by-s'-school aggregated cells. 
Regressions  conditional on LA AEN  include the LA index of Additional Educational Needs used in the central government formula (income support component) 
House prices are mean ln purchase prices for students attending the schools from 2005-2007 
Deprivation index is the index of Income Deprivation Affecting Children (IDACI) produced by the Department of Communities and Local Government 
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Table 3b: 'Balancing' tests. ACA index instrument 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Standardised 
Age-7 ks1 tests 
Age 
(months) 
Girls FSM English first 
language 
White Deprivation 
index 
Number of 
students 
Log house 
price 
4-schools: Student 
level IV         
 
Total exp pp 4yr -0.092 0.146 0.018 0.062*** -0.065 -0.063 0.032 - - 
Unconditional (0.068) (0.100) (0.016) (0.014) (0.070) (0.056) (0.024)   
          
Total exp pp 4yr -0.117 0.202 0.022 0.054** 0.000 0.018 -0.012 - - 
Conditional on LA AEN (0.082) (0.113) (0.019) (0.018) (0.084) (0.066) (0.026)   
 343237 343237 343237 343237 343237 343237 285346   
4-schools: School-level          
ACA index -0.033 0.055 0.005 0.021*** -0.026 -0.024 0.013 1.591 0.024 
Unconditional (0.024) (0.040) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.023) (0.012) (9.348) (0.014) 
          
ACA index -0.040 0.070 0.006 0.015* 0.001 0.008 -0.004 -1.462 0.021 
Conditional on LA AEN (0.025) (0.040) (0.006) (0.006) (0.026) (0.021) (0.010) (9.957) (0.014) 
 8100 8100 8100 8100 8100 8100 6763 8100 8100 
Notes: Regressions of various characteristics on school expenditure variables.  Specifications include school-group fixed effects (4-school clusters) 
Results in top panel are from student-level regressions:  Refer to Table 2 
Results in bottom panel are from regressions on school s-school-by-s'-school aggregated cells. 
Regressions  conditional on LA AEN  include the LA index of Additional Educational Needs used in the central government formula (income support component) 
House prices are mean ln purchase prices for students attending the schools from 2005-2007 
Deprivation index is the index of Income Deprivation Affecting Children (IDACI) produced by the Department of Communities and Local Government 
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Table 4: Results using boundaries that do not coincide with features. Effects of school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11.  
Each coefficient is from a separate regression using 4-school clusters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
Control variables No Yes 
   
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.225*** 0.209** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.067) (0.064) 
First stage: F-stat 195.8 160.1 
   
Number of observations: 297138 students in 833 4-school clusters 
Notes: refer to Table 2 
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Table 5: Heterogeneity in effect of expenditure by school characteristics. LA Income IV-fixed effect estimates. 4-school clusters 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10 
 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 ks2 
total score 
Age-11 ks2 
total score 
 
High FSM Low FSM More 
boys 
More girls High 
white 
High non-
white 
Low age-7 
score 
High age-
7 score 
High inc. 
deprived 
Low inc. 
deprived 
           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.289*** 0.098 0.251** 0.349*** 0.020 0.334*** 0.240*** 0.229** 0.323*** 0.202 
Unconditional (0.060) (0.105) (0.096) (0.075) (0.162) (0.058) (0.069) (0.082) (0.063) (0.106) 
1st stage F-stat 153.4 82.32 112.6 94.05 85.78 171.0 158.8 107.0 152.1 82.56 
           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.371*** -0.073 0.266*** 0.330*** -0.074 0.382*** 0.297*** 0.185 0.392*** -0.027 
Conditional (0.067) (0.112) (0.077) (0.075) (0.147) (0.071) (0.060) (0.108) (0.072) (0.109) 
1st stage F-stat 161.1 56.86 154.2 104.0 48.20 135.2 193.2 76.86 147.4 74.84 
 153806 189431 186714 156523 177025 166212 188666 154571 153574 189663 
Notes as Table 2 
Low age-7 score is below Level 2b in Reading, Writing and Maths; High score is Level 2a or above in Reading, Writing and Maths 
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Table 6: Effects of school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11.   
Each coefficient is from a separate regression using 4-school clusters. 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
Control variables No Yes 
Maths   
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.198*** 0.221*** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.059) (0.055) 
   
Science   
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.260*** 0.261*** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.060) (0.063) 
   
English   
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.169** 0.175** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.060) (0.063) 
   
 
Notes: refer to Table 2 
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Table 7: Response of expenditure shares to total expenditure per pupil. LA Income IV-fixed effect estimates. 4-school clusters 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Teachers Education 
support 
staff 
Other 
staff 
Development 
and Training 
Premises Learning 
resources 
and ICT 
Professional 
services 
Supplies Other 
          
          
Total exp pp (£000s) -0.037*** -0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.009** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
1st stage F-stat 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 144.0 
Mean share 56.4% 14.7% 8.4% 0.5% 6.6% 4.7% 3.0% 3.8% 1.8% 
          
IV regressions of expenditure shares on total expenditure. 
Number of school-by-year observations = 8123 
School-by-year level regressions. Years 2004-2009 
Instrument is  
Teachers: includes teachers, supply and agency teachers 
Other staff includes: administrative, clerical, premises, catering and other employees 
Premises includes: Building maintenance and improvement; grounds maintenance and improvement; cleaning and caretaking; water and sewerage 
energy; rates; other occupation costs 
Professional services includes: bought in professional services – curriculum; bought in professional services – other 
Supplies includes: administrative and catering supplies 
Other includes: insurance costs, loans, other financial outlays 
Instrument is mean income per pupil from LA (mean in LA as a whole) 
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
Table A1: Effects of school spending on student ks2 test scores at age 11.  Each coefficient is from a 
separate regression using 4-school clusters. Estimates on cross-boundary, cross-sectional variation only. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA income IV 
cross-boundary 
LA ACA IV 
cross-boundary 
LA ACA IV 
cross-boundary 
Control variables No Yes No Yes 
     
Total expenditure 4 yr mean 0.306*** 0.267*** 0.275** 0.379** 
per pupil (1000s) (0.074) (0.075) (0.098) (0.119) 
1st stage F-stat 251.6 170.5 50.02 49.15 
     
Notes: refer to Table 2 
Regressions include local cross-boundary k-school-cluster-by-year fixed effects 
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Table A2: Heterogeneity in effect of expenditure by pupil and school. LA Income IV-fixed effect estimates. 4-school clusters 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10 
 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
Age-11 
ks2 total 
score 
 FSM Not FSM Boys Girls White 
Non-
white 
Low age-7 
score 
High age-
7 score 
High inc. 
deprived 
Low inc. 
deprived 
By student type                 
Total exp pp 4yr 0.289*** 0.222** 0.274*** 0.196** 0.248* 0.202*** 0.281*** 0.152** 0.152** 0.274*** 
Unconditional (0.053) (0.074) (0.064) (0.060) (0.102) (0.052) (0.070) (0.049) (0.049) (0.070) 
1st stage F-stat 187.9 234.2 214.8 224.1 188.8 190.5 201.5 218.2 218.2 179.2 
           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.301*** 0.199** 0.278*** 0.211*** 0.186* 0.299*** 0.259** 0.178** 0.306*** 0.073 
Conditional (0.071) (0.067) (0.058) (0.063) (0.095) (0.057) (0.085) (0.060) (0.064) (0.088) 
1st stage F-stat 181.8 183.0 194.3 188.0 136.6 164.0 194.9 153.9 193.2 116.3 
 96774 246461 173331 169906 197227 146003 67388 76053 76053 133013 
By school characteristics           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.289*** 0.098 0.251** 0.349*** 0.020 0.334*** 0.240*** 0.229** 0.323*** 0.202 
Unconditional (0.060) (0.105) (0.096) (0.075) (0.162) (0.058) (0.069) (0.082) (0.063) (0.106) 
1st stage F-stat 153.4 82.32 112.6 94.05 85.78 171.0 158.8 107.0 152.1 82.56 
           
Total exp pp 4yr 0.371*** -0.073 0.266*** 0.330*** -0.074 0.382*** 0.297*** 0.185 0.392*** -0.027 
Conditional (0.067) (0.112) (0.077) (0.075) (0.147) (0.071) (0.060) (0.108) (0.072) (0.109) 
1st stage F-stat 161.1 56.86 154.2 104.0 48.20 135.2 193.2 76.86 147.4 74.84 
 153806 189431 186714 156523 177025 166212 188666 154571 153574 189663 
Notes as Table 2 
Low age-7 score is below Level 2b in Reading, Writing and Maths; High score is Level 2a or above in Reading, Writing and Maths 
 
